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By George B. Lear*
S the question of proximate cause aquestion of law, in Illinois, or a ques-
tion of fact, or is it a mixed question
of law and fact? There are cases that
seem to support each of these proposi-
tions. Proximate cause is ordinarily a
question of fact for the jury, but where
the facts are undisputed, and the infer-
ences to be drawn from them are plain,
and not open to doubt by reasonable men,
it is the duty of the court to determine
the question as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court of Illinois in Meyer
v. Butterbrodt, 146 Ill. 131, held that, "un-
less there has been some prejudicial error
in the court's instructions upon the ques-
tion ot proximate cause, when an issue
is formed, and a trial had by a jury, and
there is any evidence tending to show
that the wrong complained of was the
proximate cause of the injury, the finding
of the jury on the question of proximate
cause, when approved by the trial and
Appellate Courts, is as conclusive against
the appellant on that as on any other fact
in the case."
In spite of this positive statement of
the law, the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly reversed the finding of the jury,
when approved by the trial and Appellate
Courts, on the ground that there was a
lack of proximate cause. It might be
added here, that the courts of last resort
in all of the other states have, at different
times, taken the same shifting, and incon-
sistent, positions with regard to this same
question. The question naturally arises,
why should there be this general confu-
sion and inconsistency, when it is so easy
to state the rules governing proximate
cause?
The answer is to be found in the fact
that, when the courts are talking about
proximate cause, they are thinking about
something quite different, and translating
it into the language of proximate cause.
Strange as it may seem, in most of the
cases that are reversed for lack of proxi-
mate cause, the casual relation was either,
not involved at all, not in issue, or not
decisive of the real issue in the case.
In order to make the truth of this ap-
parent, it will first be necessary to
analyze the different problems 'that are
found in every tort action, and then apply
the resulting tests to the cases that are
supposed to turn upon the question of
proximate cause.
The following analysis of a tort action
has been so ably worked out and so
clearly presented by Leon Green on pages
2 and 3 of his valuable work entitled
"Rationale of Proximate Cause," that it
will be given here substantially verbatim.
(1) Is the plaintiff's interest protected
by law, 1. e., does the plaintiff have
a [legal] right?
(2) Is the plaintiff's interest protected
against the particular hazard [loss or
injury] encountered?
(a) What rule (principle) of law
protects the plaintiff's interest?
(b) Does the hazard encountered fall
within the limits of the protec-
tion afforded by the rule?
(3) Did the defendant's conduct violate
the rule which protects the plaintiff's
interest?
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(4) Did the defendant's violation of such
rule cause the plaintiff's damages?
[This is our proximate cause prob-
lem.]
(5) What are the plaintiff's damages?
Questions (1) and (2) are questions of
law to be answered by the cou.rt in per-
forming its judicial function before any-
thing else is considered in the case, be-
cause the answers to them are decisive,
in most cases, of the only question in
issue in the case. Questions (3), (4)
and (5) are questions of fact to be an-
swered by the jury under appropriate in-
structions of the court, in performing its
legal function of determining the facts
in the case. The court often fails to per-
form its judicial function, either because
it fails to recognize the first two prob-
lems as peculiarly its own, or because it
prefers to let the jury try to solve them.
Now if the jury, composed of laymen
ignorant of the law, makes a mistake in
solving these problems that are so diffi-
cult for a trained and experienced lawyer,
what does the reviewing court do when
the case is brought before it? It gener-
ally solves the problem by assuming it to
be one of causal relation, and as a result,
we have another confusing case on proxi-
mate cause.
Judge Cooley, in his treatise on the
Law of Torts at page 30 § 15, lays down
this first proposition in dealing with
proximate cause: "In the case of any
distinct legal wrong, which in itself con-
stitutes an invasion of the right of an-
other, the law will presume that some
damage follows as a natural, necessary
and proximate result."
In Brownback v. Frailey, 78 Ill. App.
262, the plaintiff sought to recover, in
an action of trespass, for the fright and
consequent miscarriage caused by the de-
fendant's threatening her with a whip.
The reviewing court held that the defend-
ant as a trespasser, was liable for all the
proximate consequences of the assault,
even though he was ignorant of her preg-
nant condition, and could not have antic-
ipated such a result from his assault.
In this class of cases, i. e., torts of abso-
lute liability, as distinguished from those
of conditional liability, the same or simi-
lar states of facts have occurred so
frequently and have been passed upon so
often by the courts that the problems as
to whether the plaintiff has a legal right,
and whether the hazard encountered falls
within the limits of the protection to be
given the plaintiff's interest, are problems
no longer, and in their place has grown
up a body of very definite rules of law
governing such cases. As Judge Cooley
says, "Here the wrong itself fixes the
right of action; we need not go further
to show a right of recovery, though the
extent of recovery may depend upon the
evidence."
The second proposition is this: "When
the act or omission complained of is not
in itself a distinct wrong, and can only
become a wrong to any particular indi-
vidual through injurious consequences re-
sulting therefrom, this consequence must
not only be shown, but it must be so con-
nected by averment and evidence with
the act or omission as to appear to have
resulted therefrom according to the ordi-
nary course of events, and as a proximate
result of a sufficient cause." Cooley on
Torts, p. 30 § 15.
In Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, the
plaintiff sought to recover for the fright
and resulting nervous disorder caused by
the defendant's abusive conduct and lan-
guage towards her, and in her presence.
A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed
because it was held to be against public
policy to allow a recovery in such cases,
where the only. damage suffered by the
plantiff consisted of fright and nervous
shock, and where there had been no
physical impact. It was also held that the
defendant was guilty of no negligence,
because such a result was not to be antici-
pated by the defendant from his conduct,
and that if the plaintiff were allowed tc
recover in such cases, then any person
who might happen to be passing by in the
street could also recover, if he suffered
fright and nervous shock as a result of
hearing or seeing the defendant's violent
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conduct. This hazard does not fall within
the scope of the protection to be given
the plaintiff's interest, and if the trial
court had solved its own problem, the
case would have been disposed of without
going to the jury.
In Phillips v. Dickerson, 85 Ill. 11, the
plaintiff sought to recover for fright and
consequent miscarriage resulting from
the defendant making an assault upon her
husband, within her hearing, but not in
her presence. The defendant did not
know that she was in the next room, and
that she could hear him, nor did he know
that she was pregnant at that time. The
trial court sustained a demurrer to the
plaintiff's evidence, and gave judgment
for the defendant. The Supreme Court,
in a divided opinion, affirmed the judg-
ment on the ground that the defendant's
conduct was not the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injuries, inasmuch as the
defendant could not have anticipated any
such results from his conduct. If we
apply the test for causal relation laid
down by Professor Green in his Rationale
of Proximate Cause at page 139, "Was
the defendant's conduct an appreciable
factor in causing plaintiff's damages?"
we find that the causal relation is very
evident and really not in issue at all.
The decisive problem is once again the
scope of the protection to be given the
plaintiff's interest, and when that is
solved, the question of causal relation
disappears. "This," says the same author,
on page 78, "is the most common error
found in the decisions involving proxi-
mate cause; that of mistaking a question
of the scope of the protection to be given
an interest for a problem of causal rela-
tion."
Injuries due to fright in the absence of
physical impact are not within the scope
of the protection afforded by the rule of
law invoked. This is really based upon
public policy, a balancing the interests
involved with the conclusion that it is
better to deny protection under such cir-
cumstances than to undertake to give
compensation under all the difficulties of
the case. See Green Rationale of Proxi-
mato Cause, page 36.
This case also illustrates another very
common error in holding that, because
the defendant could not foresee or antici-
pate such a result from his conduct,
therefore it was not a proximate result
of his conduct. The test for negligence,
viz., "Could the defendant foresee the
probability of harm resulting from his
conduct?" is in Professor Green's words,
a qualitative test for a qualitative prob-
lem, while the test for causal relation, as
already given, is a quantitative test for
a quantitative problem. The two prob-
lems are so essentially different that it
can only produce more confusion to try
to solve one problem by applying the test
for the other.
In City of Rockford v. Tripp, 83 Ill.
247, the plaintiff sought to recover for
personal injuries received by him as a
result of having been run over by a team
of horses that became frightened and
broke a hitching post, provided by the
defendant city, and ran away. The Su-
preme Court, in reversing a judgment for
the plaintiff, held that there was no evi-
dence of negligence on the part of the
defendant city in providing said hitching
Post, and that the damages were too
remote, and not a proximate consequence
of the defect in the post. This is a case
where, the evidence raising no issue of
negligence, and thus demanding a di-
rected verdict on this point, the problem
is treated as one of causal relation for
the. court. The question of causal rela-
tion is not in issue, because if the defend-
ant's conduct did not violate the rule of
law invoked to protect the plaintiff's in-
terest, then the causal relation is imma-
terial.
The next cases to be considered are
those that are covered by Judge Cooley's
next proposition, p. 30 § 15: "If the origi-
nal act was wrongful, and would nat-
urally, according to the ordinary course
of events, prove injurious to some other
person or persons, and does actually re-
sult in injury through the intervention
of other causes which are not wrongful,
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the injury shall be referred to the wrong-
ful cause, passing by those which were
innocent."
In American Express Co. v. Risley, 179
11. 295, the plaintiff, a brakeman, sought
to recover for personal injuries received
by him when he was struck by a chute
that the servants of the defendant left
lying crosswise in the express car con-
trary to their usual custom. The motion
of the train caused the protruding end
of the chute to strike against a car stand-
ing on a side track, which, in turn, caused
the other end of the chute to swing
around and strike the plaintiff. A judg-
ment for the plaintiff was affirmed by
the Supreme Court, which held that the
negligence of the defendant's servants in
leaving the chute in that dangerous posi-
tion was the proximate cause of the in-
jury to the plaintiff. Here again the
scope of the protection to be given an
interest is mistaken for a problem of
casual relation. There is no question of
casual relation in issue.
Professor Green, in his "Rationale of
Proximate Cause," page 27, analyzes a
recent Illinois case as follows: "In Mas-
kaliunas v. C. & W. I. R. R. Co., 318 Ill.
142, the plaintiff, a young boy [nearly
eight years of age], sought to recover for
injuries received while trying to board a
moving [freight] train operated by the
defendant in the city of Chicago. Negli-
gence was predicated on the defendant's
failure to have its right of way fenced
as required by a city ordinance. The
court having held that the ordinance was
for the protection of infants against such
hazards (their own irresponsible tres-
passes) and the jury having found casual
connection between the failure to main-
tain a fence and plaintiff's injuries, judg-
ment in the plaintiff's favor was affirmed.
Again, the decisive question was the
scope of protection afforded by the rule
violated by the defendant." He further
states, "The same process is inevitable in
suits based upon the rules of the com-
mon law. The fact that the rule is stat-
utory or of common law origin can make
no difference." In Heiting v. C. R. I. &
P. Ry. Co., 252 Ill. 466, which was based
on very similar facts and the same city
ordinance, the court and jury reached
the same conclusions as in the preceding
case and the same comment would apply.
In Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Bluhm,
109 Ill. 20, the plaintiff sought to recover
for injuries received while working for
the defendant, from the breaking of a
defective derrick provided by the defend-
ant. This resulted in certain lumber
falling upon the plaintiff and breaking
his arm between the elbow and the shoul-
der. Due to some mistake in the treat-
ment of this fracture, the ends of the
bone failed to unite, thus forming a
"false joint." The Supreme Court, in af-
firming a judgment for the plaintiff, held
that, if the plaintiff had used ordinary
care in the selection of the doctors and
nurses to treat his injury, then the negli-
gence of the defendant was the proximate
cause not only of the original injury, but
also of the additional aggravation of that
injury caused by the mistake of the doc-
tors and nurses in treating the injury.
This is normally not a problem of causal
relation, but one of the scope of the pro-
tection afforded by the rule that the de-
fendant has violated. This is a problem
for the court, and it must consider all the
factors in the case, and not merely the
cause factor alone. The fact that mis-
takes in curing an injury are naturally
incident to an injury, has a tendency to
influence the court to extend the protec-
tion to cover the most usual of these
hazards. Green's Rationale of Proximate
Cause, pp. 105-106.
The next group of cases to be analyzed
are those that illustrate Judge Cooley's
next proposition, p. 31 § 15: "If the origi-
nal wrong only becomes injurious in con-
sequence of the intervention of some dis-
tinct wrongful act or omission by an-
other, the injury shall be imputed to the
last wrong as the proximate cause, and
not to that which was more remote."
In Schmidt v. Mitchell, 84 Ill. 195, the
plaintiff sought to recover, under the
Dram Shop Act, for the death of the
plaintiff's husband, as a result of the de-
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fendant selling liquor to her husband,
whereby he became intoxicated, and while
intoxicated, was shot in the thigh, in at-
tempting to break in the windows of a
house at night. The trial court refused
to admit evidence that he had used the
injured leg contrary to the doctor's or-
ders. After several days, the leg was
amputated and he died three hours later.
It was also contended that the amputa-
tion of the injured leg was unnecessary.
The Supreme Court, in reversing a judg-
ment for the plaintiff, in a divided opin-
ion, with two judges dissenting, held that
the death was due to his own misconduct
in using the injured leg contrary to the
doctor's orders and not to the intoxica-
tion. This was not a question of causal
connection but it was a problem for the
court-that of defining the limits of the
protection afforded by the statute. This
applies as well to the mistake of the
doctor in amputating, as it does to the
injured party's own misconduct in dis-
obeying the doctor's orders.
In Schulte V. Schleeper, 210 Ill. 357, the
plaintiff sought to recover under the
Dram Shop Act the compensation pro-
vided for by said act, to be paid the plain-
tiff for taking care of B, while he was
recovering from the effects of injuries
received while B was intoxicated, as a
result of the defendant selling liquor
to B. The defendant sold liquor to P and
B, who became intoxicated, and while in
that condition, P assaulted B with a
buggy spoke and hub causing serious
injury to B. The Supreme Court, in af-
firming a judgment for the defendant,
held that the assault by P on B was the
proximate cause of B's injuries and not
the intoxication of B. It also held that
the trial court was Justified in sustaining
the demurrer to the declaration for lack
of proximate cause as a matter of law.
This was not a cause problem, either, but
a question of law, for the court, whether
such an injury is within the scope of the
protection afforded by the statute.
In Milostan v. City of Chicago, 148 Ill.
App. 540, the city had permitted an open-
ing or areaway of considerable dimen-
sions to remain unguarded in a sidewalk
which ran along beside a building. A
companion of the plaintiff, who was walk-
ing with him along the sidewalk, grabbed
the plaintiff from the rear and pushed
him into the opening, resulting In serious
injuries to the plaintiff. The Appellate
Court, in reversing a judgment for the
plaintiff, held with one judge dissenting,
that the defendant's negligence was not
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's in-
juries because the wilful act of the plain-
tiff's companion intervened and broke
the causal connection. In his Rationale of
Proximate Cause, on -page 101, Professor
Green, discussing this case, says, "It is
possible perhaps to make a cause issue
under the facts by considering the part
played by the city's negligence with that
of the companion who shoved plaintiff
into the hole. It is possible to say the
city's fault played no appreciable part
in the result. But it is much clearer,
equally decisive, and perhaps more ra-
tional to consider that the hazard here
involved did not fall within the protec-
tion of the rule violated by the city. If,
on the other hand, the plaintiff had been
passing In the dark and had stumbled
into the hole, such would have been a
hazard within the rule. When the rule
has been bounded, the cause issue dis-
appears in cases of this character."
The next group of cases to be consid-
ered are those from which Judge Cooley
draws the following conclusion: "If the
damage has resulted directly from con-
current wrongful acts or neglects of two
persons, each of these acts may be counted
on as the wrongful cause, and the parties
held responsible, either jointly or sever-
ally, for the injury." Cooley on Torts, p.
31 § 15.
In Village of Carterville v. Cook, 129
Ill. 152, the village had permitted a side-
walk, which was six feet above the sur-
face of the ground, to remain unguarded
by a railing. When another boy pushed
his companion into the plaintiff, a boy
fifteen years of age, the plaintiff was
knocked off the sidewalk at this unguard-
ed place and seriously injured. The Su-
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preme Court, in affirming a judgment for
the plaintiff, held that the negligence of
the village and the concurrent negligence
of the boy who pushed the other boy
into the plaintiff constituted the proxi-
mate cause of the injury. The hazard
was one that the plaintiff was protected
against, because it was a negligent act,
as distinguished from an intentional act,
as in the preceding case. "The big point,"
as Professor Green on page 158 of his
Rationale of Proximate Cause says, in
discussing these two situations, "is that
in the case of the plaintiff's being inten-
tionally forced into the hole, the court
would probably hold the harm received
was not a hazard protected against by the
rule invoked, while in the other case
it was. The duty to protect the plaintiff
against hurt from the excavation does not
comprehend risks arising from X's [third
party] intentional acts, while it does his
negligent acts."
In True & True Co. v. Woda, 201 Ill.
315, the defendant piled lumber on a side-
walk, in violation of a city ordinance.
The plaintiff's intestate, a four year old
child, was playing around the lumber
pile with other children when some heavy
timbers fell off the pile and killed the
child. It did not appear, whether the
timbers fell as a result of being imper-
fectly piled, or as a result of the other
children throwing them off the pile. The
Supreme Court, in affirming a judgment
for the plaintiff, held that the defendant's
negligence was the proximate cause of the
death of the child, and that the defend-
ant should know that a pile of lumber
on a sidewalk was likely to attract small
children and that some of the lumber
would fall on them and injure them. The
negligent conduct of the other children
was a risk against which the child's in-
terest was protected by the "rule invoked.
In Weick v. Lander, 75 Ill. 93, the de-
fendant had piled building material on
both sides of a street, leaving only a nar-
row passageway for the traffic. The plain-
tiff's son, twelve years of age, was riding
in a wagon, which was suddenly stopped
by a collision with another wagon, at
the place where the defendant had ob-
structed the street. The driver of an-
other wagon, which was following, did
not notice the wagon in front stop, and
the pole of the rear wagon struck the
boy and killed him. The Supreme Court,
in affirming a judgment for the plaintiff,
held that the defendant's unlawful con-
duct in obstructing the street amounted
to a nuisance, and was the proximate
cause of the boy's death. The negligent
conduct of the other driver was a risk
against which the boy's interest was pro-
tected by the rule invoked.
In West Chicago Street Ry. Co. v.
Feldstein, 169 Ill. 139, the plaintiff sought
to recover for injuries received as a re-
sult of the collision of two street cars
operated by different companies. The
rear end of one car swung around and
struck the plaintiff, as he was waiting for
the car to pass, and thus caused his in-
jury. He sued both companies, and then
dismissed as to one company and took
judgment against the other. The Su-
preme Court affirmed the judgment, say-
ing that the negligence of the defendant
was the proximate cause of the injury,
even though it was unusual, as both com-
panies were joint tort-feasors. The negli-
gent act of the other company was a risk
against which the plaintiff's interest was
protected by the rule invoked.
In Stecher v. People, 217 Ill. 348, the
plaintiffs sought to recover, under the
Dram Shop Act, for the death of their
father, which deprived them of their
means of support. The defendant sold
liquor to B, who became intoxicated, and
while in that condition, shot and killed
the father of the plaintiffs. In affirming
a judgment for the plaintiffs, the Court
held that the intoxication of B was the
proximate cause of the death of "the
father, as B would not have shot the
father had B been sober. This was a risk
against which the plaintiffs' interest was
protected by the statute.
In Meyer v. Butterbrodt, 146 Ill. 131,
the plaintiff sought to recover, under the
Dram Shop Act, for the death of her hus-
band. The defendant sold liquor to her
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husband, who became intoxicated, and
while in that condition, he went in swim-
ming and was drowned, although, ordi-
narily, a good swimmer. In affirming a
judgment for the plaintiff, the court held
that the husband's intoxication was the
proximate cause of his death. This was a
risk against which the plaintiff's interest
was protected by the statute invoked.
The cases on proximate cause which have
arisen under this statute are in hopeless
confusion. On almost similar states of
fact, the decision in the Schulte case is
directly opposed to that in the Stecher
case, and the decision in the Schmidt case
is directly opposed to that in the Meyer
case. The causal connection is evident
in all four cases, but the Supreme Court
persisted in making the decisive factor
that of proximate cause, instead of that
of defining the limits of the protection
to be given the plaintiff's interest by the
Dram Shop Act.
The next cases deal with the question,
of how far one may be chargeable with
the spread of fire negligently started by
himself. In Fent v. T. P. & W. Ry. Co.,
59 Ill. 349, sparks from a locomotive
operated by the defendant set fire to A's
house from where it spread to the plain-
tiff's house and destroyed it. The court
sustained a demurrer to the evidence,
and gave judgment for the defendant.
The Supreme Court held it was rever-
sible error to hold, as a matter of law,
that the damages were too remote, as
that was a question for the jury, and that
the loss was a natural consequence and
was foreseeable. According to Professor
Green causal relation is seldom involved
in these fire cases. Usually the decisive
question is negligence. Most courts sub-
mit these cases to the jury on the issue
of negligence. Was the loss by fire in this
particular way a probable consequence,
and could the defendant foresee such a
result? To hold that such a result is not
the proximate result of defendant's con-
duct is erroneous. Cause is not the weak-
ness of the plaintiff's case. There are
only two problems in such cases; one
for the court, as to the scope of the pro-
tection, and the other for the jury, as
to the defendant's negligence or ability
to foresee such a result.
In T. W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Muthersbaugh,
71 Ill. 572, a warehouse near the right
of way was set on fire by sparks from a
locomotive operated by the defendant. A
strong wind carried fire brands from the
burning warehouse to the plaintiff's
stables, a distance of one hundred rods,
and set fire to, and destroyed the stables.
A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed
by the upper court on the ground that
the loss was not a proximate result of
the defendant's conduct. Cases which
deny liability for lack of proximate cause
on facts similar to those in this case are,
in -the words of Professor Green, legal
atrocities. In C. P. & St. L. Ry. v. Willard,
111 Ill. App. 225, sparks from a locomo-
tive operated by the defendant set fire
to the plaintiff's peat land and growing
crops. While the plaintiff was busy sav-
ing his crops, his cattle, standing on the
burning peat, were badly burnt about
the legs and injured. A judgment for the
plaintiff was affirmed by the upper court
on the ground that such a result was fore-
seeable, and was a proximate result of
the defendant's negligence. Is such a
hazard within the limits of the protection
afforded? Was such a result foreseeable
by the defendant? These are the only
problems involved, and they are mistaken
by the court for a problem of causal
relation.
Judge Cooley, page 37 § 16, says, "Where
an injury is due to a defect in a street
or highway in conjunction with the fright
of a horse, the defect is generally held
to be the proximate cause." In City of
Joliet v. Shufeldt, 144 Ill. 403, a horse
while being driven along a street, runs
away without fault on the part of the
driver or thd plaintiff, whereby the plain-
tiff is thrown from the vehicle at a place
where the street was left by the city In
an unsafe condition and injured. A judg-
ment for the plaintiff was affirmed on the
ground that the defect was the proximate
cause, and that public policy favored lia-
bility in such cases, in order to minimize
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the number of accidents and injuries on
the crowded streets due to a failure to
keep the streets in repair. What the
court is doing here is defining the limits
of the protection to be given by the rule
invoked but again it is mistaken for a
cause problem.
In City of Rock Falls v. Wells, 169 Ill.
224, the plaintiff, in order to avoid a
collision with a run-away horse, drove
her sleigh to the other side of the street
but was held by a street-car track that
was raised several inches above the sur-
face of the street. The run-away horse
caused the wheel of the buggy he was
attached to, to slide along the track and
strike the plaintiff and injure her. A
judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed
by the upper court, which held that the
defect was the proximate cause of the
injury as it was foreseeable that it would
cause some injury. Again this is not a
cause problem, but a matter of defining
the limits of the protection. In City of
Bellville v. Hoffman, 74 Ill. App. 503, the
plaintiff was injured when his horse ran
away and his wagon upset when it struck
a street-car track that was elevated sev-
eral inches above the surface of the
street and left in that condition by the
city. A judgment for the plaintiff was
affirmed on the ground that the defect
was the proximate cause. When the scope
of the protection is fixed and the negli-
gence of the city is found, the cause prob-
lem disappears in this class of cases.
The next group of cases are those that
are authorities for the following proposi-
tion as given by Judge Cooley on page
38 § 16: "Where the act or omission com-
plained of merely creates a condition, it
is not the proximate cause of an injury
produced by other causes which take ef-
fect in the particular way by reason of
the condition." In Wabash R. R. v.
Coker, 81 Ill. App. 660, the plaintiff, with
a horse and wagon, and another person,
with a horse and buggy, were detained
by the defendant blocking a railroad
crossing for more than ten minutes, con-
trary to the statute. When the locomo-
tive coupled to the cars, the horse of the
other person became frightened and
caused the buggy to strike against the
wagon, and thus throw the plaintiff to
the ground and injure him. The review-
ing court, in reversing a judgment for
the plaintiff, held that the violation of
the statute was not the proximate cause,
as the accident might have happened as
well within the legal period of blocking
the crossing as when it did. "The prob-
lem is not one of causal relation. The
conduct of the defendant contributed ap-
preciably to the result. The fact that the
same result might have ensued irrespec-
tive of the defefhdant's violation of the
statute does not mean that the violation
of the statute did not contribute thereto.
Neither does the fact that the other
agency contributing to the result is either
a natural force, or an innocent or wrong-
ful act of another person, in any wise
affect causal relation." The foregoing
comments are from Professor Green's
Rationale of Proximate Cause. The big
point is to define the scope of the pro-
tection given to the plaintiff's interest by
the statute.
In C. C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Lindsay, 109
Ill. App. 533, the defendant violated the
statute by blocking a crossing for more
than ten minutes, thereby compelling the
plaintiff to turn and drive up the right
of way in order to cross the track. The
plaintiff's horse became frightened by an
approaching freight train and ran into a
barb-wire fence along the right of way
and was injured. A judgment for the
plaintiff was reversed by the upper court
on the ground that the violation of the
statute was not the proximate cause of
the result, because such a result was not
to have been foreseen. This is another
case of mistaking the problem of the
scope for the protection for one of causal
connection. And it is another example
of the mistake of saying that it is not
proximate, because it is not forseeable.
The comment on the preceding case ap-
plies with equal force to the Lindsay
case.
In Chicago & Alton Ry. v. Becker, 76
Ill. 25, the plaintiff's intestate, a boy of
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seven, with two other boys heard the
whistle of the approaching train operated
by the defendant and. started for the
crossing. The other two got across, but
this boy stumbled and fell on the track
when the engine was only sixty feet
away. It was impossible to stop a heavy
freight train in such a short distance
and the boy was killed. In reversing a
judgment for the plaintiff, the court held
that there was no proximate cause, be-
cause the boy's contributory negligence
was an intervening agency, and that there
was no evidence of negligence on the part
of the defendant. This was a case where
the boy's own conduct defeated the pro-
tection afforded by the rule.
In Hullinger v. Worrell, 83 Ill. 220,
the plaintiff sought to recover from the
defendant, a sheriff, for an assault com-
mitted by B, a third person, upon the
plaintiff, and for the expenses incurred
by the plaintiff in having B bound over
to keep the peace. The negligence of the
defendant was predicated upon his per-
mitting B to escape while in his custody,
previous to said assault. The court sus-
tained a demurrer to the declaration, and
gave judgment for the defendant. The
upper court, in affirming the judgment,
said that since the plaintiff was not a
party to the criminal proceedings under
which B was held in custody, the escape
of B was no legal injury to him, and
that the subsequent assault by B on the
plaintiff and the procuring B to be bound
over were not the proximate consequences
of the defendant's negligence in permit-
ting B to escape, nor was the escape the
proximate cause thereof. The vital ques-
tion was whether the plaintiff's interest
was protected against the particular haz-
ard encountered here. In the case of the
plaintiff's being intentionally and wilfully
assaulted by a third party, the court
would probably hold that the harm re-
ceived was not a hazard protected against
by the rule invoked.
In Strojny v. Griffin Wheel Co., 116 Ill.
App. 550, the plaintiff sought to recover
for injuries received as a result of the
act of a fellow-servant in knocking off
a piece of hot metal from a tub used to
convey the molten metal, while he and
the plaintiff were engaged in cleaning
said tubs. The piece of hot metal struck
and injured the plaintiff. The negligence
of the defendant was predicated upon its
failure to provide sufficient workmen.
The upper court, in affirming a judgment
for the defendant, held that the lack of
help was not the proximate cause, and
that there was no evidence of any negli-
gence on the part of the defendant. Here
again the interest of the plaintiff was not
protected against the particular hazard,
the negligence of a fellow-servant.
In Lorette v. Director General, 306 Ill.
348, the plaintiff was climbing through a
train of cars at a crossing, in violation
of a statute, when the cars started sud-
denly and threw him under the moving
wheels and injured him. The Court, in
affirming a judgment for the plaintiff,
held that the mere fact that the plain-
tiff was violating a statute at the time
would not bar his recovery, unless it
was the proximate cause of the accident.
"If the illegal act is a mere condition
which made it possible for the accident
to occur but no part of it, it will not bar
the plaintiff." The plaintiff was pro-
tected against the hazard because his
conduct did not defeat the protection af-
forded.
The last group of cases to be con-
sidered deal with the question as to
whether the negligence which puts life
and property in danger is the proximate
cause of injuries sustained in a reason-
able attempt to avoid the peril, or to
save the property. In Pullman Palace
Car Co. v. Laack, 143 Ill. 242, the plain-
tiff was a foreman for the defendant, in
charge of a brick kiln which was heated
by oil. When, owing to the faulty con-
struction of the oil-burners, a fire broke
out that threatened to spread to, and
cause the explosion of, a car filled with
oil, that was standing near, and was con-
nected with the oil-burners by means of a
supply-pipe, the plaintiff ordered one of
his men to cut off the supply of oil, by
shutting a valve on the car. Upon being
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assured that the oil was shut off, the
plaintiff went under the car to discon-
nect the supply-pipe, but when he had
disconnected the supply-pipe he discov-
ered that the oil had not been shut off,
and it poured out over his clothing, which
caught fire, seriously burning him. The
Court, in affirming a judgment for the
plaintiff, held that the injury was due to
the concurrent acts of negligence of the
master and the fellow-servant, and that
each was liable, jointly and severally. It
also said that the plaintiff was justified in
attempting to save the property of his
master. The decisive point is not causal
connection, but whether the hazard was
within the scope of the protection, and
whether the plaintiff's conduct had de-
feated the protection afforded.
In I. C. R. R. v. Siler, 229 Il. 390,
sparks from an engine operated by the
defendant set fire to rubbish that the
defendant had permitted to accumulate
along its right of way, from where it
spread to the premises of the plaintiff's
intestate, and threatened to destroy her
house. In attempting to stop the prog-
ress of the fire, by raking the leaves
around her house towards the fire, her
clothing caught fire and she was burned
to death. The Court, in affirming a judg-
ment for the plaintiff held that the de-
fendant's negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury, as it was to have been
anticipated that she would attempt to
save her property from the fire. No
cause issue is involved. The first ques-
tion was whether the hazard fell within
the scope of the protection, and the
second question was whether the defend-
ant should have anticipated injury to
the plaintiff's person from the accumu-
lation of the rubbish. Negligence was the
only real issue in the case.
In Laudgraf v. Kuh, 188 Ill. 484, the
plaintiff's intestate, who was working in
a building owned by the defendant when
a fire broke out, attempted to get out by
a window by means of a fire-ladder, but
it collapsed when someone below jumped
on it, and the plaintiff's intestate fell to
the sidewalk below and was killed. The
defendant's negligence was predicated on
his failure to provide fire-escapes as re-
quired by law. The trial court directed
a verdict for the defendant. The upper
court, in reversing the judgment for the
defendant, held that it was reversible er-
ror to take the question of proximate
cause from the jury, and that the effort
to escape In some other way might have
been caused by the absence of fire-
escapes. Again, no cause issue is in-
volved. The first question is whether the
interest effected fell within the protec-
tion of the rule, and the other question
is whether the defendant should have
anticipated injury to the person of the
plaintiff's intestate from the absence of
fire-escapes.
It will have occurred to the reader by
this time that the grouping of the cases
in this article, which has been done in
accordance with the most approved and
generally accepted rules of proximate
cause, as laid down by Judge Cooley in
his work on Torts, has actually separated,
instead of bringing together, cases that
involved the same problem, as for in-
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stance: the. cases involving the construc-
tion of the Dram Shop Act. This was
done purposely, in order to demonstrate
the utter lack of any rational principle
underlying the orthodox method of han-
dling the problem of causal relation. In-
stead of clarifying the problem, the ortho-
dox rules only add to the confusion al-
ready so. prevalent.
It must be apparent by this time that
the reviewing courts, in passing upon
the scope of the protection to be given
an interest, always treat it as a question
of causal connection, and discuss it in
the old, time-worn terminology of proxi-
mate cause. They never seem to see the
humor of the situation. It must also be
obvious by this time that the question
of causal relation is really not involved
at all in the great majority of the cases.
One of the reasons why the courts persist
in treating this problem as one of causal
relation is found in the reluctance of the
courts to admit that they are making the
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law, by what has been aptly termed judi-
cial legislation, when they are defining
the limits of the protection to be given
an interest by a statute or by a rule of
the common law.
As to the problem whether proximate
cause is a question of fact for the jury,
or a question of law for the court, the
conclusion to be drawn from the cases is
that when the reviewing court deter-
mines that the hazard encountered is
within the range of the rule, then the
finding of the jury that there was proxi-
mate cause is final and conclusive, but
when the court determines that the haz-
ard encountered is not within the range
of the rule, then the finding of the jury
that there was proximate cause is re-
versed as not supported by the evidence.
This is not rational, and can produce
nothing but confusion, because in one
case the finding of the jury is final and
conclusive, and in the next case it may
be reversed. All this confusion is the
natural and proximate result of the irra-
tional orthodox method of determining
the answers to the many questions in-
volved in a tort action by assuming them
to be questions of causal relation. And
until the trial court, in its judicial func-
tion, frankly meets and answers the ques-
tions: Has the plaintiff a legal right?
and, Is that right protected against the
particular hazard encountered? we shall
not have any clarification of the law as
regards the question of proximate cause.
A Farewell Message From
Class of February 1929
A new semester is well on its way at
good old Chicago-Kent and the members
of the Class of February 1929, for the
first time in three years no longer ex-
change friendly greetings in the halls at
10 North Franklin. Instead we are busily
engaged in brushing away mental cob-
webs and refreshing our understanding
in the subject of legal jurisprudence
preparatory to the March Bar. We re-
lax a moment however to extend to the
newcomers at School a most hearty wel-
come and wish them as pleasant and
successful a period at Kent as has been
our pleasure to experience. To the mem-
bers of the faculty, administration offi-
cers and many friends whom we leave
behind we say a fond farewell, hoping
to continue on into the future our many
friendships and associations. For our-
selves it must be said that we intend to
carry on the progressive spirit of Chi-
cago-Kent. We will have an opportunity
to evidence that by attending, every
man, at the Home Coming Luncheon to
be held on June the 6th. Our attendance
should be 100% as it is on the evening
of that day that we should formally re-
ceive our graduating credentials. Fur-
ther announcements of these occasions
will be given later. Again let it be re-
peated to the members of the Class of
February, 1929, do not forget the annual
Home Coming.
ARTHUR C. JEPSON, Pres.
Round Table
The members of the Round Table held
their monthly meeting February 2nd at
the Electric Club with Mr. Eric Collins
presiding. The new members introduced
were as follows: Messrs. Lee L. Turoff,
'31, Frank A. Stromquist, '31, Allen M.
Klein, '31, John Rex Allen, Jr., '31, Mor-
ton B. Hochberg, '31, Walter H. Jentzsch,
'30, Edwin G. Gemrich, '30, Win. W.
Hamilton, '30, Robert J. Burdett, '30,
John M. Falasz, '30.
The speaker was Mr. Charles Francis
Baker of our faculty. He gave us a
very profitable as well as enjoyable lec-
ture on "Liability of Bailees for their
Principals' Goods." He first took up the
liability of a forwarder who waves the
common law liability, and laid down the
rule that the vendor has not implied au-
thority to wave the common law liability
in Illinois without proof of an expressed
contract.
Mr. Baker also took up .the obligation
of the bailees to deliver the goods, hold-
ing that an express company must make
an actual delivery to the person to whom
the goods are consigned, and must de-
liver to that particular consignee, or it
is liable.
